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COMPOUNDING OFFENSES
Compounding is agreeing for a consideration not to prosecute one who has
committed a crime. In the very early days of the common law, when the offense
of compounding was known as theftbote,1 it made one an accessory after the
fact, but in later times it was regarded as an independent offense and punishable
as a misdemeanor.2 The purpose of the law in punishing this wrong is to protect
public justice. In the case of Shaw v. Reed it was pointed out:
"If it be the duty of every man, it is more especially the duty of persons
injured, who have caused criminal prosecutions to be commenced, to
appear against offenders, and not to make bargains to allow them to
escape conviction, if they or their friends will pay a sum of money to
repair the injury. To decide that such bargains might be lawfully made,
would be to tend a helping hand to make public justice venal." 3
The nature and characteristics of the offense of compounding make it necessary
to distinguish it from the crime of being an accessory after the fact and that of
misprison. Compounding is readily distinguished from the crime of being an
accessory after the fact by the nature of the assistance rendered the wrongdoer.
Being an accessory implies some sheltering or concealment, while compounding
is an abstaining from a prosecution. It is differentiated from misprison by the
consideration. Misprison is a mere concealment of a crime; compounding is a
concealment for a reward.4
The scope of thL crime at common law was limited to felonies and to
serious misdemeanors. The reason given for this was that the law favors rather
than discourages the adjustment of controversies which do not affect the public.
In most states this offense of compounding has become the subject of statutes.
The appropriate Pennsylvania statute on this offense reads as follows:
"Whoever, having a knowledge of the actual commission of any treason,
misprison of treason, murder, manslaughter, rape, sodomy, arson, forgLry, counterfeiting, or passing counterfeit money or notes, burglary,
housebreaking, robbery, larceny, receiving stolen goods or other property by persons knowing them to be stolen, kidnapping, bribery, perjury
or subornation of perjury, takes money, goods, chattels, lands or other
reward, or promise thereof, to compound or conceal, or upon agreement
to compound or conceal any of the crimes aforesaid, is guilty of compounding crime, a misdemeanor, and on conviction thereof, shall be
sentenced to pay a fine not exceeding one thousand dollars ($1,000),
or to undergo an imprisonment not exceeding three (3) years, or both."r5
The Code of 1939 punishes the compounding of only eighteen enumerated
offenses. The punishment provided for compounding these crimes is three years
1 Com. v. Pease, 16 Mass. 91 (1819); Forshner v. Whitcomb, 44 N. H. 14 (1862).
2 State v. Hodge, 142 N. C. 665, 55 S. E. 626, 7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 709 (1906).

3 Shaw v. Reed, 30 Me. 105 (1849).

§ 5; 4 BLACKSTONE COMM. 133.
5 Act of June 24, 1939, P. L. 872, § 307; 18 P. S. 4307.

4 1 HAWKINS P. C., c.59,
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imprisonment or a fine of $1,000 or both. Since the first statute of this kind
was passed in 1860, many new offenses have been added to our Code. These
crimes are possibly as serious as those offenses enumerated; however, the statutes
which created them did not provide for their compounding. For example, larceny
and receiving stolen goods are among the enumerated crimes. These offenses are
punished by the Code with five year's imprisonment. Incest, certainly an equally
nefarious crime, and punishable by the same penalty, is not included in the
list of offenses the concealing of which is punished. In addition, since the Code
provides three year's penalty for the compounding of any of the named offenses,
it results that it is as serious a crime to compound some of them as actually to
commit them. Still more out of line is the inclusion of the compounding of
bribery, for the penalty for bribery is only one year's imprisonment, while the
penalty for concealing it is made three years. However, these inconsistencies are
remedied by making the concealment of every crime punishable and by grading
the punishment of compounding according to the seriousness of the offense compounded.
The essential elements of the crime of compounding consist of (1) an
agreement not to prosecute the perpetrator, (2) for a consideration to compound
a crime, (3) which has actually been committed. The court said in Fountain v.
Bigham:

"The essential ingredients of the crime, it will be observed are: that a
forgery was committed, that the obligee in the bond had knowl'edge of
the actual commission of the offense at the time he took the bond,
and that in consideration of being given the bond to secure his indebtedness, he agreed 'to compound or conceal the crime' ... The gist of the
offense is the agreem'ent not to prosecute the crime, known by the
injured party to have been committed, in consideration of his receiving
the obligation." 6
(1) An agreement to forbear from a prosecution or to withhold evidence
of the crime is essential. The bare receiving back of one's stolen or embezzled
goods or the acceptance of security therefor is not unlawful unless there be
some agreement to compound the crime.7 This is true even though the owner
after such return of the property or taking of the security abstains from prosecuting.8
The agreement may be expressed or implied. Threats of prosecution, however,
unless a certain security is given, will not justify an inference that if the security
is given the agreement is that no prosecution will follow. 9

6 Fountain v. Bigharn, 235 Pa. 35, 84 A. 131 (1912).
'7 1 HAwKINs P. C., c.59, § 7.

* Flower v. Sadler, 10 Q. B. D. 572.

9 Swope v. Jefferson Ins. Co., 93 Pa. 251 (1880).
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It is immaterial whether the agreement is performed or not. The offense
of compounding is complete on the making of the agreement, and the fact that
the wrongdoer is later prosecuted does not affect it.10
(2) The second essential element of the offense is that there must be a
consideration for the agreement. The character of the consideration is immaterial.
This may be anything of value, even a promise." It has even been held that
the settlement of a felony charge against one person is a sufficient consideration
for the settlement of a felony charge against another person. Provided the other
essential ingredients of the crime are present, the latter agreement is punishable
as compounding a felony.' 2
The consideration need not be given by the person whose wrong is compounded. It is not required that the defendant be benefited by the consideration.
It is sufficient if he takes it for the benefit of another or the public. 13
(3) The third ingredient of the offense is the actual commission of a crime.
There is a conflict of opinion here as to whether this element is required. In the
majority of jurisdictions, including Pennsylvania, this element isrequired. The
Pennsylvania statute expressly states that knowledge of the actual commission of
the crime is required. The reasons given for this are: first, the public is not
injured by the refusal of a private person to present or prosecute a crime, if in
fact no crime has been committed 1" and second, there can be no compounding
of a crime unless there is a crime to compound.' 5
The perpetrator of the original crime need not be first tried and convicted. 1 '
The later conviction or acquittal of the wrongdoer of the original offense is not
a defense.
The mental element required by the Pennsylvania statute is a knowledge of
the actual commission of the offense, and not a knowledge of the person who

committed it.
Persons who may be liable for concealing an offense are usually not limited
to those directly injured thereby. However, there is some authority to the contrary. There is authority that the crime may be committed by:
(1) The person injured by the crime. The authorities of the early years
of the common law, when the crime was still known as theftbote, stated that
the offense could be committed only by the owner of the goods, and by analogy
10 State v. Dunhamrnmel, 2 Del. 532 (1836); State v. Ash, 33 Or. 86, 54 p. 184 (1898).
11 Com. v. Pease, 16 Mass. 91 (1819).
12 Hays v. State, 15 Ga. A. 386, 83 S. E. 502 (1914).
23
14
16
16

Windhill Local Bd. of Health v. Vint, 45 Ch. D. 351.
State v. Leeds, 68 N. J. L. 210, 52 A. 288 (1902).
Hays v. State, 142 Ga. 592, 83 S. E. 236 (1914).
Watt v. State, 97 Ala. 72, 11 S. 901 (1892); State v. Guthrie, 150 Iowa 149, 129 N. W. 804

(1911).
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some of the courts have held that concealing can be committed only by the persons
directly injured by the crime. 17
Some third person. Since the law permits not only the person injured
by a crime, but also all other members of the community to prosecute, it is criminal
for any one to make such a composition tven though he suffered no injury and
has no concern in the crime. 18
(2)

(3) At common law the wrongdoer, or the person who pays the consideration, seems not to have been guilty. Some statutes, however, are so worded as to
include such persons.
The Pennsylvania statute expressly states who may be liable. Whoever, having
a knowledge of the actual commission of any of the enumerated crimes, takes
some reward or promise thereof, to compound any of the listed crimes is guilty of
concealing a crime.
Under some state statutes, the parties may compound certain offenses with
the consent, and within the discretion, of the court or designated officials. Pennsylvania has such a statute, which reads as follows:
"In all cases where a person shall, on the complaint of another, be bound
by recognizance to appear or shall, for want of security, be committed,
or shall be indicted for larceny or fraudulent conversion, where the value
of the goods and chattels alleged to have been stolen or the property
alleged to have been fraudulently converted is less than two hundred
dollars, or for an assault and battery, or other misdemeanor, to the injury
and damage of the party complaining, and not charged to have been
done with intent to commit a felony, or not being an infamous crime,
and for which there shall also be a remedy by action, if the party complaining shall appear before the magistrate, who may have taken recognizance or made the commitment, or before the court in which the indictment
shall be, and acknowledge to have received satisfaction for such injury
and damage, it shall be lawful for the magistrate, in his discretion, to discharge the recognizance which may have been taken for the appearance
of the defendant, or, in case of committal, to discharge the prisoner,
or for the court also, where such proceeding has been returned to the
court, in their discretion, to order a nolle prosequi to be entered on the
indictment, as the case may require, upon payment of costs: Provided,
That this act shall not extend to any assault and battery, or other misdemeanor, committed by or on any officer or minister of justice.""t
In order that a crime may be settled under this act it must be: (1) a misdemeanor, (2) to the injury and damage of the party complaining, (3) not charged
to have been done with intent to commit a felony, (4) not an infamous crime,
1 Hale P. C. 546; 1 Hawkins P. C., c.59, § 6.
Watt v. State, 97 Ala. 72, 11 S. 901 (1892)_; Peo. v. Byron, 103 Cal. 675, 37 p. 754 (1894);
State v. Ash, 33 Or. 86, 54 p. 184 (1898).
19 Act of March 31, 1860, P. L. 427, § 9; Act of April 11, 1929, P. L. 514, § I as aziiended
Act of May 26, 1949, P. L. 1816, § 1; 19 P. S. § 491.
17
1s
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a remedy by action, and (6) not committed by or on
justice. All these conditions must be present for the
And settlements must be made in the manner set
court said in Commonwealth v. Carr:

"It is essential to such a settlement that the complainant shall acknowledge to have received satisfaction for such injury and damages, and
until that is don there is no settlement, and neither partial settlement by the defendant, nor an agreement falling short of an acknowledgement of satisfaction in the manner provided by the act, bars a
prosecution for the criminal offense." 21
Assault and battery, libel, seduction, false pretenses, and the fraudulent
removal of goods are offenses which may be settled under this statute. Larceny
where the value of the goods is greater than two hundred dollars, because it is
28
a felony,2 2 and forgery because it is an infamous crime, and embezzlement by a
bank officer 2 4 may not be settled. The court stated in Pearce v. Wilson:
"Itis very evident, from the phraseology of the act, that it was not
intended to apply to misdemeanors of so grave a character . . ., but only
to such as are to the personal injury and damage of the prosecutor,
and do not specially affect the public. '26
The effect of the settlement, as stated in the statute, is that the recognizance
is discharged or the prisoner is discharged by the magistrate, or the indictment
is nolle prossed by the court, as the case may require. However, as a matter of
fact, a settlement effected in the manner prescribed by the statute has a four-fold
26
effect: ( 1 ) it relieves the defendant from criminal liability for the offense settled; 27
(2) it renders valid and enforceable contracts given in effecting the settlement;
28
(3) it relieves the defendant from civil liability for the damage or injury;
and (4) it relieves the defendant from criminal liability for compounding crime.
Robert H. Griffith
20
21
22
28

Com. v.
Com. v.
Conmey
Bredins

Heckman, 113 Pa. Super. 70 (1934); Com. v. Scott, 7 Pa. Super. 590 (1898).
Carr, 28 Pa. Super. 122 (1905).
v. McFarlane, 97 Pa. 361 (1881).
Ap., 92 Pa. 241 (1879).

24 Pearce v. Wilson, 11 Pa. 14 (1885).
25 Ibid.

26 Corn. v. Carr, 28 Pa. Super. 122 (1905); Com. v. Scott, 7 Pa. Super. 590 (1898).
17 Geier v. Shade, 109 Pa. 180 (1885).
28

Ibid.

